


# Aperiodic traffic in response time analyses with adjustable safety level

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Validation is a key activity in automotive systems design  
Personal view on the developments

Mostly ahead  
of us!

« correctness by construct » and  
optimal synthesis

Probabilistic analysis  
system level

« Worst-case » deterministic analysis  
system level

Probabilistic analysis (sub-system)

« Worst-case » deterministic analysis (sub-system)

« Smart » monitoring tools

Simulation tools (co-simulation, HIL)

1994

1997

2009



## Probabilistic analysis is needed

- Systems are not designed for the worst-case (provided it is rare enough!)
- Reliability/Safety are naturally expressed and assessed in terms of probability (e.g.  $< 10^{-9}$  per hour)
- Deterministic assumptions are sometimes unrealistic or too pessimistic, e.g.:
  - Worst-Case Execution Time on modern platforms,
  - Aperiodic activities: ISR, frame reception,
  - ...
- Faults/errors are not deterministic (and better modeled probabilistically)



## Accounting for the aperiodic traffic

- Transmission patterns can hardly be characterized: purely aperiodic, mixed periodic/aperiodic, etc
  - Aperiodic frames do jeopardize RT constraints
  - Few approaches in the literature:
    - deterministic approaches, such as sporadic, generally lead to unusable results (e.g.,  $\rho > 1$ )
    - Average case probabilistic approach not suited to dependability-constrained systems
- Probabilistic approaches with safety adjustable level, see paper ref[6] and ref[7]



## Approach advocated here


- 1) Measurements / data cleaning
- 2) Modeling aperiodic traffic arrival process
- 3) Deriving aperiodic Work Arrival Process (WAF)
- 4) Integrating aperiodic WAF into schedulability analysis



## Data trace analysis


y: aperiodic interarrival times – x: index of interarrivals

ZOOM +




x : [0-1500]  
y : [0-25]

Approximate because what is seen on the bus is not the actual arrival process at ECU level! can be handled




x : [0-1500]  
y : [0-2.5]



x : [0-250]  
y : [0-2]




Question: are interarrival times i.i.d. ?




Distribution fitting for aperiodic interarrival : 3 candidates here

Kolmo. Smi. and  $\chi^2$  tests to confirm visual impression



## Captured data trace VS random trace generated with MLE-fitted Weibull



## Deriving the aperiodic WAF


- $S(t)$  : aperiodic WAF
- $X(t)$  : stochastic process which counts the number of aperiodic frames in time interval  $t$
- “smallest”  $S(t)$  such that the probability of  $X(t)$  being larger than or equal to  $S(t)$  is lower than a threshold  $\alpha$

$$\hat{S}(t) = \min\{S(t) \mid \underline{Pr}[X(t) \geq S(t)] \leq \alpha\}$$

By simulation, numerical approximation or analysis (simplest cases such as exp.)

Design choice:  
e.g.,  $10^{-9}$


## Aperiodic WAF depends on the underlying interarrival distribution




## Case-study on a typical body network

- Body network benchmark generated using GPL-licensed Netcarch
- Characteristics:
  - 125kbps, 16 ECUs, 105 CAN frames with deadlines equal to periods and 1 to 8 bytes of data.
  - Total periodic load is equal to 41%
- NETCAR-Analyzer for WCRT computation
- 3% aperiodic traffic
- 7 byte aperiodic frames
- $\alpha = 10^{-4}$

## Worst-case response times with/out aperiodic traffic (3%)



## On a more loaded network...



## Observations

- In this context where the periodic load is relatively small and the aperiodic traffic is limited (3%) one observes:
  - aperiodic traffic significantly impacts the worst-case response times of the periodic frames (more than +30% sometimes).
  - the exact model of the aperiodic traffic plays some role
  - depends on the priority of the aperiodic frames (working on this)
  - Measured arrival time on bus at which the frames started to be transmitted can be different than time at which the transmission requests were issued



## Conclusion

- Chosen dependability requirements are met while pessimism kept to minimum:
  - Practical approach
  - Real data are required
  - Can be extended to the non i.i.d. case (not needed here)
- What is needed now is a system level approach that
  - Can handle arbitrary activation processes
  - goes beyond the i.i.d. case (for dependability assessment)





## References




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- [2] P. Wallin, Axelsson, A Case Study of Issues Related to Automotive E/E System Architecture Development, IEEE International Conference and Workshop on the Engineering of Computer Based Systems, 2008.
- [3] H. Hansson, M. Nolin, T. Nolte, Beating the Automotive Code Complexity Challenge: Components, Models and Tools, National Workshop on High-Confidence Automotive Cyber-Physical Systems, 2008.

### Dependability / probabilistic framework

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## Questions / feedback ?



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